Civilnet
Dr. Marta Regalia is a specialist on elections and constitutions at the Italian Institute of Human Sciences
The proponents of Armenia’s constitutional reform stress the urgency of a majority premium concept (stable majority) for Armenia. This concept was taken from the Italian system known as Italicum.
Italicum, which has not yet been implemented, will come into effect in Italy in July 2016. It has generated and continues to generate an intense debate in Italy.
CivilNet reached out to Dr. Marta Regalia, a specialist on elections and constitutions at the Italian Institute of Human Sciences to elaborate on the peculiarities of Italicum and its potential application in Armenia. Regalia says that “in the case of Armenia, a system like Italicum can strengthen the winning party without developing a likewise strong opposition.”
What are the main strengths and weaknesses of Italy's new electoral system (Italicum) and how was it received in Italy?
In December 2013, the Italian Constitutional Court passed a judgment on the electoral law (a proportional system with a majority bonus) declaring it unconstitutional for two main reasons: because it did not foresee a minimum threshold in order to attain the majority premium and because of long and closed lists of candidates. The immediate effect of the sentence was to speed up the electoral reform. The proposal came from Prime Minister Matteo Renzi after an agreement with Silvio Berlusconi, whose party, however, did not vote the final approval of the so-called Italicum.
The new electoral law foresees a majority-assuring semi-open list proportional representation system. Seats are allocated, first at the national level, with a proportional formula and the largest remainders method among the parties that overcome the 3 percent threshold nationally. Then, they are assigned to the 100 districts (with a magnitude range from 3 to 9 seats). The allocation, however, is not fully proportional, as it assigns a majority bonus to the party (coalitions are not allowed) that obtains at least 40 percent of the votes. If no party goes beyond this threshold, the two most voted parties compete in a second, run-off election. The winning party gets 340 seats (out of 630). The remaining seats are allocated proportionally among the other parties.
Lists of candidates are semi-open: the first candidate in each list is blocked (and will be the first to be elected, if his/her party wins a seat in that district). All the other candidates are elected on the basis of preferential voting. Multiple candidacies are allowed, only for list leaders, in up to 10 districts. Lists must present gender alternation and voters can express two preferences, but only if in favour of candidates of different gender, otherwise only the first preference will be considered valid. The law will apply only to the Chamber of Deputies starting from July 2016, since the parallel constitutional reform will transform the Senate in an assembly not elected by the citizens but representative of Italian regions.
Italicum has generated and is still generating an intense debate. There are many criticisms. I list here the main ones, in order of importance:
1) The Italian constitutional system is based on a rather “consensual” structure. So there are mechanisms and checks and balances to prevent a minority from controlling the main powers of the State. This law gives the majority of seats to a single party that might represent a tiny minority of the electorate. This party will be able, on its own, to elect the President of the Republic and 1/3 (i.e. 5) of the judges of the Constitutional court (both from the fourth round of vote). Since 1/3 is nominated by the President, it is possible that a single party can control 2/3 of the Court.
2) The majority bonus can distort representation without assuring governability. In a fragmented party system such as the Italian one, it is highly probable that different parties will run the election under the same party label, but then they will split as soon as they enter into the parliament, ultimately without any gains in terms of majority stability or governability. The blackmail power of small parties will remain the same. Also, Italicum does not fundamentally reshape the party system, but rather replicates the existing balance of power among (unstructured) parties.
3) The electoral threshold (3%) is too low to prevent party fragmentation.
4) Multiple and blocked candidacies in up to 10 districts for list leaders may distort the relationship between voters and candidates.
On the other hand, supporters of Italicum underline that:
1) The system allows voters to choose who governs them, not only who represents them, and the run-off system makes this very clear for voters.
2) The system favours governability without sacrificing too much representation thanks to a low electoral threshold.
3) Small parties will lose their coalition and their blackmail potential.
4) The system will incentivize the formation of a two-party system.
5) The system will increase the presence of women in the parliament.
What has been the reaction of comparative political science on Italicum?
The Italicum was approved in May and will come in force in July 2016. Since it has never been used in an election, not many articles have been published on it, which is normal. However, a notable exception is Gianfranco Pasquino’s article on Contemporary Italian Politics.
What's the relationship of Italicum with democracy in general? Do the key terms of the system, including its reliance on electoral bonus and a second round of parliamentary elections, contain any threat to the functioning of democratic institutions? Do you think Italicum can be successfully exported to a country with much weaker democratic traditions?
Italy has a long history with the majority bonus. In 1953, a few years after the end of Fascism, the Christian Democrats approved a law with a majority bonus (65% of seat to the party reaching the absolute majority of votes). The law, called “swindle law”, attracted much criticism and started an acrimonious debate. Actually, the Constituents chose a (quasi) pure proportional system with the goal of avoiding a return to autocracy. However, no party reached that threshold and the law was repealed straight after.
More than 50 years later, in 2005, Italy had another electoral law with a majority bonus but without thresholds and run-off. This law was also criticized because of its disproportionality. However, the anti-democratic nature of the law did not merit any serious attention in Italy (even if some commentators (and some parties) raised it).
The problem I see here is that the majority bonus has to be harmonized with the other features of the political system. As I said, the issue of the election of the President of the Republic is not a second-order problem. Obviously, the regime type matters, but what is really essential is that the political systems has some strong checks and balances to the power of the (artificially) created parliamentary majority.
Armenia's Presidential commission for constitutional reforms has proposed the main terms of a future electoral system that are vividly reminiscent of Italicum. If Italicum was to be transplanted to Armenia, what would be the implications of such a move for the country? The main features of Armenia's political landscape in a nutshell: underdeveloped party system; ‘party of power’ regularly winning elections; no opposition ever able to win in an election; chronically contested elections; super-consolidation of power in the office of the president, and increasingly, since recent years, in the hands of the ruling party headed by the president; weak or absent mechanisms of horizontal accountability, and no real separation of powers.
The problem I see with a majority bonus in a transitional, hybrid regime is that it provides the majority of seats to the party winning the plurality of votes. Even if the second round can provide a “bonus” of legitimacy, the principle does not change. Moreover, usually second rounds have a lower turnout, and this may deepen the mentioned legitimacy problem.
Then, if I have to think about the possible implication of a majority bonus system in a hybrid regime, I’d rather compare the bonus to a “winner takes all” system. Political scientists have shown that somehow it’s better for transitional regimes to adopt electoral systems (and forms of government) that allow for power-sharing. Of course, this does not mean that government stability and effectiveness should not be taken into consideration when choosing an electoral formula. But there are other ways of obtaining the same results without running the risk of extreme fragmentation of the party system. In this sense, the German model is of course better than the Italian one. Higher electoral thresholds or small districts can have the same effect.
In the case of Armenia, a system like Italicum can strengthen the winning party without developing a likewise strong opposition. Of course, a higher electoral threshold can help in strengthening one opposition party without fragmenting the opposition into many parties. Moreover, much will also depend on coalitions. Italicum does not allow for coalitions. So, if the Armenian electoral system will permit them, it is possible that opposition parties can join their votes to become stronger in the second round.
It is always difficult to give a complete judgment about an electoral system without knowing in which constitutional structure it will be inserted. Of course, in the absence of mechanisms of horizontal accountability and separation of powers, no electoral system will work.
Dr. Marta Regalia holds a PhD (2011) from the Italian Institute of Human Sciences (SUM). During her PhD, she was appointed a Visiting Student Researcher by Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. She recently edited, with Gianfranco Pasquino and Marco Valbruzzi, a volume on Italian political science, Quarant’anni di scienza politica in Italia (Il Mulino, 2013).
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