Conflict Transformation: The Prospects for Nagorno Karabakh
Civilnet
Political scientists Artak Ayunts, Mikael Zolian and Tigran Zakaryan have published a research paper on the current status of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. They maintain that the ruling regimes of Armenia and Azerbaijan do not have real incentives to find solutions to the conflict because the current status quo serves to reinforce their grip on power. Therefore, in the absence of these incentives, it falls to civil society to undertake initiatives aimed at reducing enmity and building the prerequisites of peace between the sides of the conflict through conflict transformation mechanisms. The following is a summary of that report.
Non-democratic political regimes in Armenia and Azerbaijan do not have strong incentives for changing the current no-war-no-peace situation. The status quo helps the political elites to maintain their grip on power, while the political risks associated with altering the status quo are too high.
At the same time the ruling elites do not have incentives to aim for a military resolution of the conflict (at least in the short run), since that would also be connected with serious risks and uncertain rewards. However, there still remains a possibility for escalation, due to the situation of mutual mistrust and attempts to use incidents on the border to advance the interests of one side or the other.
In a situation, when the political elites have few incentives to advance the agenda of peaceful resolution, it falls to civil society to undertake initiatives aimed at reducing enmity and building prerequisites of peace between the sides of the conflict through conflict transformation mechanisms.
The way out of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict
In 2014, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict entered its twentieth year of a fragile ceasefire. The lack of a permanent solution has only entrenched ethnic hatred, negative stereotypes and war rhetoric towards the other. In late July - early August 2014, the parties to the conflict exchanged the worst violent offensive since the ceasefire agreement in 1994, claiming dozens of deaths on all sides.
One of the key factors contributing to maintaining the current stance of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is the propaganda of negative stereotypes towards the adversary through the channels of mass media and other leverages ruling regimes keep under their control. Caucasus Barometer survey results indicate that the vast majority of the population in Armenia and Azerbaijan see the other side as the main enemy of their country.[1]
The unresolved conflict is often used by the political elites in the countries of conflict to legitimize their power, consolidate support around them, marginalize opponents and neutralize democratizing pressures. Ruling regimes, therefore, do not have strong incentives to seek for conflict resolution, since the status quo serves the interests of authorities to maintain power. Under such conditions, when immediate conflict resolution is unlikely, conflict transformation approaches are considered as necessary means to deal with the conflict in the long term. Given that political elites have almost no incentive to implement this task, civil society actors come increasingly to fore: only through Track-Two initiatives supported by civil society actors can conflict transformation practices advance and subsequently bring peace in the region.
Is authoritarian peace possible?
In the situation when the conflict is frequently used by the ruling elites in the parties to conflict and conflict resolution mechanisms fail, conflict transformation approaches may serve as means for future peace among embittered adversaries.
Conflict transformation is a comparably innovative approach of dealing with conflicts. It can take place in at least four different ways: by transformation of actors, issues, rules and structure. Since actor, rule and issue transformation require significant efforts by the political leadership in the countries engaged in conflict who are not ready to compromise their political capital, the only one which can be applied in Nagorno Karabakh is structural transformation. Structural transformation as the key subject matter of conflict transformation stands out in dealing with conflict and building long-lasting peace in Nagorno Karabakh. Building peace through conflict transformation is not merely a post-conflict agenda: it is a wider and a more encompassing notion, including actions and approaches which support conflict transformation. Peacebuilding supposes actions both before a peace treaty as well as after it. Peace is a dynamic process requiring tireless efforts in building a relationship and trust among conflict parties.
What can be done?
It is hard to expect that the regimes in the countries of conflict will exert full-scale war. However, the threat of unintended escalation cannot be disregarded. At the same time, making compromises, a necessary component for any significant steps towards conflict resolution, is fraught with serious risks, both internally and externally. Moreover, while the risks are obvious, the benefits from the point of view of the political elites are quite dubious. The good news, however, is that for similar reasons neither of the ruling elites are interested in resuming a full-scale confrontation, since that would also be connected with serious risks.
A long-term peace has to be built, not by official signatures, but by participation of citizens building trust and peace together. In order to rebuild relationships, more innovative ways of providing space within which the psychological aspects of the conflict can be addressed should be sought. If the political elites of the countries of conflict are not ready for compromises that could pave a way to peace, other actors should take on responsibility for transforming the conflict by bottom up activities. Without addressing the exacerbated relations among Armenians and Azerbaijanis, the conflict will continue strengthening antagonistic attitudes and sustain a no-war-no-peace situation.
It is here that Track Two activities can support transformation of attitudes and behavior with individual and group transformations being the key to a peace process. It is encouraging that despite the growing obstacles, most of the peacebuilding actors on the ground on Track Two level in Armenia are optimistic about their work. The focus of public diplomacy should be:
- education and training programs for youth with an aim to resist mainstream hate speech/propaganda within and across the conflict divide,
- cross-border confidence-building measures sustaining the ceasefire agreement,
- initiatives addressing issues of mutual concern such as environmental, economic and related to human security.
As for now, bottom up peacebuilding initiatives require significant amount of courage and responsibility by civil society actors across the conflict divide. While the short-term effect from these initiatives may be low, they remain the only available channel of constructive dialogue between societies. In the long run, such initiatives can bear significant results.
Recommendations:
To the Governments: to tone down militant rhetoric and distance themselves from propaganda of hatred in the media against the countries of the conflict. While such rhetoric/propaganda may bring short-term benefits to the authorities, in the long run they lead to entrenched enmity and thus contribute to the risks of destabilization, raising potential risks of conflict escalation, which may be detrimental not only for the societies, but also for the political elites.
To the local peacebuilding actors: to clearly formulate and set the agenda of Track Two peacebuilding activities widening the scope of people potentially willing to promote peaceful transformation of conflict and deepening the frames of activities aimed at tackling sensitive issues of compromise and future coexistence among conflicting societies.
To the international organizations/mediators: to promote civil society contacts and Track-Two diplomacy efforts focusing on conflict transformation initiatives aimed at long-term impact through educational, research and training programs as well as dialogue meetings bridging grassroots and medium-level actors across conflict divide, even despite the potential resistance of the governments involved. In cases of crackdown against civil society activists, to use the available means to influence the behavior of governments, in order to relieve the pressure on participants of civil society dialogue efforts.
To the international donors: to continue support of Track Two initiatives, particularly engaging actors from Nagorno Karabakh. Such assistance should not be stopped even in those cases when the governments create obstacles to this dialogue such as persecution of civil society figures, tightening of financial control, etc. However, the dialogue programs should and can be modified in order to protect their participants including reducing the public profile of such dialogue and creating new, regional platforms for Armenian-Azerbaijani dialogue as part of the regional South Caucasus initiatives.
The policy paper and upcoming academic article are elaborated based on the findings of desk research, expert interviews and focus group discussions conducted in the spring and summer of 2014 in Armenia with the support from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in Oslo, Norway.
[1] http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2013az/MAINENEM/ and http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2013am/MAINENEM/
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