OPINION - Corridor Politics: What Azerbaijan Really Wants From Armenia

Op-ed by Georgi Mirzabekyan

Azerbaijan’s true priority in its negotiations with Armenia is the establishment of an extraterritorial route or corridor through southern Armenia—rather than any changes to Armenia’s Constitution or the formal dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group. Although Baku continues to cite these as conditions for signing a peace treaty, its main focus has consistently been on opening a corridor linking Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan.

Armenia and Azerbaijan have recently advanced negotiations on a peace agreement, even considering a preliminary signing to formalize points of consensus. However, the real obstacle appears to lie in unresolved disagreements over regional connectivity. In August 2024, the sides agreed to treat transit routes as a separate issue, akin to how border delimitation is handled, but Baku has continued to push for a solution in line with its interests.

Following the 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement, Azerbaijan has repeatedly sought to elevate the corridor issue to a top priority, framing it as a “Zangezur corridor.” This goal has played a central role in Azerbaijan’s military pressure on Armenia over the past several years. Today, the urgency surrounding this demand is being driven by several factors.

Armenia has signaled its readiness to address Azerbaijan's formal demands—removing the constitutional reference to the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which Azerbaijan considers a territorial claim due to its indirect reference to Nagorno-Karabakh, and addressing the OSCE Minsk Group's status—in tandem with the signing of the peace treaty. This significantly narrows Baku's justification for delaying the agreement or resorting to military threats. Anticipating this, Azerbaijan is now focusing on the issue of transit, which carries broader geopolitical and logistical implications and has not been incorporated into the draft peace text.

The Azerbaijani government appears to be waiting for proposals from international actors, hoping to see the issue resolved in a manner that aligns with its strategic vision. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s acknowledgment on July 16 that Armenia had received proposals for a route through Syunik suggests that Washington is attempting to play a more assertive role in the South Caucasus, amid shifting Armenian-Russian and Azerbaijani-Russian dynamics. The U.S. proposal likely has several dimensions, and Washington is expected to remain active in the region.

By framing the transit route as a pressing, unresolved issue, Azerbaijan is increasing diplomatic pressure on Armenia. Without directly opposing the U.S. proposal, Baku is signaling that the responsibility lies with Yerevan, which must now account for its decisions not only to Washington but also to other regional stakeholders, including Russia and Iran.

Notably, Azerbaijan has largely ceased referencing the 2020 trilateral agreement’s provision for Russian border guards to oversee the route. This reflects not only recent friction with Moscow but also a deeper reluctance—shared by Turkey and the U.S.—to accept any expanded Russian presence in the corridor. Still, should Russia adopt a more explicitly pro-Azerbaijani stance, Baku may reconsider its opposition to Moscow’s role. Some voices in Azerbaijan have even suggested that Russia has failed to take sufficient steps to open the route.

For Armenia, while regional connectivity remains a significant issue, the immediate priority is finalizing a peace treaty, which would provide a more secure and stable environment. This is why the idea of preliminary signing is being actively discussed in Yerevan. The July 10 meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in Abu Dhabi likely focused on both the draft treaty and the transit issue, but no agreement was reached.

Ultimately, the route in question is no longer merely a bilateral matter between Yerevan and Baku. It intersects with the strategic interests of several powerful states. Turkey has responded positively, albeit unofficially, to the U.S. proposal. Ankara wants the corridor opened swiftly—and crucially, without any Russian presence. For Turkey, the road through southern Armenia forms a critical part of the Middle Corridor linking China to Europe. Ankara is preparing to begin construction of a 224-kilometer railway connecting Kars to Nakhichevan, which would complement the envisioned transit network.

Iran, meanwhile, sees the proposed corridor as one of the most sensitive regional issues since the 2020 war. Tehran has consistently opposed any extraterritorial arrangements and the presence of third-party powers in the Caucasus. In the wake of the U.S. proposal, Iranian officials engaged in intensified talks with their Armenian counterparts. While initially issuing general statements reaffirming support for Armenia’s territorial integrity, Tehran has since voiced more direct opposition to the U.S. plan.

Ali Akbar Velayati, senior adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, warned that the so-called “Zangezur corridor” is part of a geopolitical project orchestrated by the United States and Israel, aimed at undermining Iran’s national security. He described it as an attempt to weaken the regional axis of resistance, sever Iran’s access to the Caucasus, and impose a land blockade on both Iran and Russia from the south.

In this context, the dispute over the transit route has far outgrown the Armenia-Azerbaijan bilateral framework. It now reflects a broader struggle for influence in the South Caucasus, involving Washington, Moscow, Ankara, Tehran and also Beijing — each with its own vision for the region's future.