Knocking on Europe’s Door, Again: Armenia to Negotiate New Framework with the EU

A new phase in Armenia-EU relations to begin.

A few days ago, the European Union’s Foreign Affairs Council authorized the European Commission and the High Representative to ‘open negotiations on a new, legally binding and overarching agreement with Armenia.’

According to the statement, this agreement will replace the current EU-Armenia partnership and cooperation agreement.

As it turns out, the EU is ‘committed to further develop and strengthen comprehensive cooperation with Armenia in all areas of mutual interest within the Eastern Partnership framework.’ Negotiations are expected to commence by the end of 2015.

Authorities in Armenia also welcomed the decision. Foreign Affairs Minister Edward Nalbandian said, “We are hopeful that the document to be elaborated as a result of the negotiations will best express the depth of Armenia-EU mutually beneficial cooperation, will reflect the joint commitment to raise our relations to a new level and will outline the comprehensive partnership in all areas of mutual interest.”

The cautious enthusiasm being attached to this new stage in Armenia-EU relations has its reasons.

After more than three years of intensive negotiations with the European Union to sign an Association Agreement (AA) and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement (DCFTA), Armenia, in an abrupt u-turn on September 3, 2013 decided to join the Russian-led Customs Union instead.

That Union has now morphed into the Eurasian Economic Union (member states include Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan). Armenia became a full member of the EEU in January 2015.

This decision caused shockwaves ahead of the Vilnius Summit scheduled for November of that year, where it was expected that Armenia would formally initial the AA and DCFTA, along with Georgia and Moldova; Ukraine was expected to sign the agreements but Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich arrived at the Summit having no intention to reach an agreement, according to Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite, the host of the summit.

Yanukovich was urged to sign the AA, even though his country did not fully comply with the benchmarks. The Ukrainian president’s refusal hinged upon the benchmark ‘selective justice,’ a reference to former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, who was in prison at the time; Brussels considered her imprisonment as politically motivated.

Following the failure of the Vilnius Summit, many EU diplomats involved in the process of enlargement admitted that it was a time for reflection; it also forced EU policymakers to rethink their approach with the former Soviet republics. According to some experts, the EU has adjusted its policy and instead of the traditional regional approach, it is now looking at each country’s needs in its relations with Europe, individually.

Armenia’s decision to turn its back on the EU Association Agreement in 2013 had more to do with security and energy issues than anything else.

The tenuous and mostly self-regulated 1994 ceasefire following the Karabakh War, continually threatens to explode into an all out armed conflict and with its fragile geopolitical position, Armenia has often turned to Russia for support. Armenia is also a full member in the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization although questions remain whether or not Russia would come to Armenia’s aid if Azerbaijan were to start a new war.

Additionally, having its borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey closed, Armenia also depends heavily on Russian energy supplies.

EU in the Post-Soviet Space

Jos Boonstra, in a recent article for EurasiaReview states that Europe’s expressed interests and what it can actually achieve in the South Caucasus remains somewhat elusive “mostly due to the lack of a hard security component and limited political interest.” Boonstra goes on to say that the EU has not been able to nor wanted to be a “reliable counterweight to Russia’s hard security influence.” It has taken on the role of merchant (leading role in trade) and vicar (pushing for democratic and human rights values) but stops short of providing any kind of security guarantees, especially for Armenia.

In his analysis, Boonstra sets out proposals as to how the EU can increase its role in the region, suggesting that proposals made in a FRIDE working paper entitled “Challenging the South Caucasus Security Deficit” be further expanded. That paper proposed that the EU develop a roadmap of objectives for the region and in particular in the field of security, taking into consideration the unresolved and potentially explosive Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

After Vilnius

Following the failed 2013 Vilnius Summit, and Armenia’s decision to withdraw from the AA and DCFTA, Europe’s initial cold shoulder was understandable.

As Richard Youngs’ piece in CarnegieEurope points out, the EU, following its initial shock, has taken on a more pragmatic view with its relations to Armenia. According to Youngs, the EU has invited Armenia to cite those aspects of the AA in which it still has interest and can be compatible with the country’s membership in the EEU. “The EU’s stated aim is to help Armenia retain a degree of multivector pluralism in its foreign relations,” Youngs states. “Armenia is seen as a kind of experimental gateway between the EEU and the Eastern Partnership.”

Thereby, instead of punishing Armenia for choosing Russia, the EU is offering Armenia the tools necessary for a new framework for cooperation.

Laure Delcour, a Senior Research Fellow at the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs and Kataryna Wolczuk of the University of Birmingham co-authored a piece for the London School of Economics where they argue that this new Armenia-EU agreement proposal might become an important test case for the co-existence between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union. The authors go on to say that “pressure from Russia following Armenia’s growing engagement with the EU left the country with little choice but to sign up to the Eurasian Economic Union.”

In an opinion piece for Common Space, Dennis Sammut writes: “On the EU side there was a wish to salvage whatever possible from the years of work and negotiations, prior to September 2013, on the now defunct Association Agreement. On the Armenian side there was a desperate need, mainly for domestic political purposes, not to be seen abandoning relations with Europe, and showing some semblance of balance to what started to look like complete dependence on Russia.”

“Armenia is seen as a kind of experimental gateway between the EEU and the Eastern Partnership.”

Following the latest Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga (May 21-22), a declaration was signed that stated: “Participants welcome the common understanding reached on the scope for a future agreement between the EU and Armenia aimed at further developing and strengthening their comprehensive cooperation in all areas of mutual interest.”  

The declaration also mentioned the continuing discussion of the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreement with Armenia and launching of negotiations on an EU-Armenia Aviation Agreement. With regard to the Karabakh conflict, the declaration reiterated “full support to the mediation efforts by the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including at the level of Presidents and their statements since 2009.”

With this new round of negotiations for a new legal framework of relations, it remains to be seen how Armenia will be able to balance itself between the vested and powerful interests of Russia on the one hand and the EU on the other.

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Background Information:

Association Agreements are international agreements that the EU has concluded with countries aiming to set up an all-embracing framework for bilateral cooperation. These agreements normally provide a progressive liberalization of trade. In case of EaP countries, they do not guarantee a future membership of the EU (as there are also AA’s between the EU and non-European countries like Chile, Israel and South Africa). However, each country, nonetheless, negotiates an AA individually with the EU and there must be an intention to establish close economic and political cooperation and a privileged relationship between the EC and its partners.

Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, the DCFTA is included in the AA, but the free trade agreement has to be negotiated separately. It provides more advanced free trade zone between two or more countries. Traditionally, standard free trade agreements foresee a mutual opening of markets for goods and services. The reason that this agreement is called ‘Deep and Comprehensive’ is that it would go much further. It would be “comprehensive” because it would cover a wide array of trade-related issues and it would be “deep” because it aims to eliminate ‘behind the border’ obstacles for trade. So a DCFTA practically means a partial opening/extension of the EU’s internal market  to the country signing the agreement

Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summits are held every two years (the first two took place in 2009 in Prague, Czech Republic; and in 2011 it was in Warsaw, Poland). During these meetings the course of the Eastern Partnership is discussed, the objectives for the next two years are determined, and the prospects for the future are drawn up. The results of the meeting are reflected in a Joint Declaration, which becomes the starting point for further development of the Eastern Partnership. The 2013 Summit took place in Vilnius on November 28-29.