Tigran Grigoryan
Over the past week, I had the opportunity to engage in extensive discussions in Washington with U.S. officials and analysts from prominent think tanks, as part of a broader visit by a group of Armenian experts and journalists to the United States. While the trip is still ongoing, the conversations we had in D.C. offered a timely update on how the South Caucasus—and Armenia in particular—is perceived by key decision-makers and policy shapers under the new administration. The overall picture appears somewhat more optimistic than one might assume from Yerevan.
Although bilateral relations with Armenia and the resolution of the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict are far from being top priorities on the new administration’s agenda, there is still evident U.S. interest and involvement on both fronts.
It was encouraging to learn from our meetings that behind-the-scenes work is ongoing on several issues outlined in the U.S.–Armenia Strategic Partnership Charter, signed earlier this year. Despite initial concerns that the new Trump administration might shelve the document, it remains on the agenda, and concrete actions tied to the Charter are underway. Some visits that were delayed following the change in administration are now expected to take place, and negotiations on various strategic issues—possibly including energy cooperation—are in progress.
Importantly, there are signs that the Trump administration sees potential in the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, or at least in some of its components. The idea that the South Caucasus peace track could offer a rare and achievable foreign policy "win" might be gaining traction—especially when compared to the far more intractable crises in Ukraine and the Middle East. Key figures such as Steve Witkoff, already serving as President Trump’s special envoy in multiple peace processes, are reportedly involved in the Armenia–Azerbaijan track as well. While concerns remain about capacity and institutional memory, Witkoff’s engagement signals that the conflict is at least on the radar of the highest levels of the administration, with other senior officials also monitoring and advocating for the process.
However, while this new style of diplomacy—driven by President Trump’s special representatives—can at times deliver swift and visible results, it lacks some of the elements necessary for sustained and effective U.S. engagement.
In particular, the diplomatic and security apparatus is operating under new constraints. Although the administration has moved quickly to fill top-level foreign policy roles, many mid-level and working-level positions remain vacant. This creates a vacuum that weakens institutional coordination and makes policymaking more ad hoc and personality-driven. Another critical factor is the intentional downsizing and budget cuts across government bureaucracies, which inevitably affect the operation of the foreign policy apparatus. This has also created a degree of uncertainty in Washington, where much of the foreign policy community is still waiting for a more stable framework to emerge.
In most of our meetings there was a consistent view of Azerbaijan’s role in the regional dynamic. There is broad agreement that Baku has been a destabilizing and spoiling actor, especially following its military aggression against Armenia in September 2022. This view is shared even by some figures who, in their own words, had been sympathetic to Azerbaijan’s cause before the 2020 Second Karabakh War. The perception in Washington is that Armenia is genuinely committed to peace and regional integration, while Azerbaijan continues to create artificial obstacles and delay the signing of a peace agreement that is essentially ready to go.
This environment may bring further attention to the issue and nudge the administration toward more active engagement. And if that eventually happens, there are immediate steps the U.S. can take—starting with the release of Armenian captives and political prisoners held by Azerbaijan. The new administration has already demonstrated its ability to secure the release of political prisoners and POWs in different parts of the world—the most recent example being General Keith Kellogg mediating the release of a group of political prisoners in Belarus. A similar push in the South Caucasus and a deal with Azerbaijan could signal a major success for the Trump administration in the Armenia–Azerbaijan context and pave the way for progress on other issues. Baku has been desperately seeking engagement with the new administration without much success. That creates potential leverage for such deals.
The notion that Azerbaijan is dragging its feet on an already-negotiated agreement creates an opportunity for American diplomacy. With the right pressure, the United States could influence Baku’s calculus and help stabilize a volatile region.
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