OPINION - Five questions about the Syunik road that remain unanswered

By Karen Harutyunyan

Last week, I raised the question of why the three memoranda signed on August 8 between Armenia and the United States had not been published, particularly the one concerning the so-called Trump Route, or TRIPP.

On Friday, Armenia’s government released the texts. Strikingly, the memorandum on the “Crossroads of Peace” contains no reference to a road linking mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhichevan exclave—despite repeated public claims from Armenian and American leaders in Washington.

The document emphasizes “unequivocal support for Armenia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of its internationally recognized borders.” It outlines U.S.–Armenia cooperation on border security, customs efficiency, and infrastructure modernization. But it makes no mention of a road, corridor, or transit regime of any kind.

Also read: Syunik Road vs. Zangezur Corridor: Why the Distinction Matters

This omission matters. For months, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and government propagandists have insisted that any new route would fully preserve Armenia’s sovereignty. Yet Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev continues to call the project a “corridor,” reiterating this week that Azerbaijani citizens using it “will not see the face of an Armenian border guard.” He claimed that all of Baku’s demands have now been met.

The Armenian government stresses sovereignty in every statement. But the contrast between the silence of the memorandum and the specificity of Aliyev’s words leaves fundamental questions unanswered. If the technical details are to be negotiated later, the public still deserves clarity on what was agreed in Washington.

Questions remain unanswered:

Border control. Will Azerbaijanis traveling the route be subject to Armenian border and customs checks, or not? Has Aliyev retracted his earlier demand of “no Armenian oversight”? If so, where is the evidence? If not, how can Yerevan reconcile its sovereignty pledge with Baku’s position?

Security regime. Any transit road linking Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan must have a defined security framework. Who will guarantee the safety of Azerbaijani vehicles—Armenia, the United States, a private American consortium, or perhaps EU observers?

Ownership and leasing. In U.S. discussions, including at presidential level, officials mentioned a U.S.–Armenia consortium potentially operating the route and even leasing it for 99 years. Has this plan been dropped? Will there be no outsourcing or long-term concession?

Language of “corridor.” How can it be explained that, although the memorandum makes no reference to such a corridor, U.S. President Donald Trump used precisely that word in his remarks? Why does Turkey’s foreign minister also speak of it with great enthusiasm?

Basis of the claims. Are these statements grounded in additional written agreements that remain undisclosed, or in preliminary verbal understandings deliberately excluded from the published text?

Without answers, suspicions will only deepen. The memorandum is narrowly focused on capacity building, border security, and investment promotion. It explicitly states that it is not a binding legal document and creates no obligations. Yet the political context in which it was signed makes the omissions glaring.