How Armenia’s opposition could force a constitutional dilemma

The push to rewrite Armenia’s Constitution is clearly coming from Azerbaijan. Otherwise, no Armenian government would willingly replace a document that concentrates so much power in the hands of a single political leader.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is pursuing constitutional change because Armenia’s shattered security architecture has left him little room to resist another Azerbaijani demand. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has become both the greatest threat to Pashinyan’s political survival and, paradoxically, one of its guarantors. The opposition is neither.

Yet the opposition holds a potentially decisive advantage: the government needs just six additional votes in parliament to put a new constitution to a referendum.

Following the June 2026 parliamentary elections, Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party controls 64 of the National Assembly’s 105 seats. Under Armenia’s Constitution, a two-thirds majority, 70 votes, is required to submit a new constitution to a nationwide referendum.

The missing votes could come from the opposition Strong Armenia Alliance, which holds 29 seats, and/or the Armenia Alliance, which has 12.

Both opposition forces have rejected the proposed constitutional changes, describing the future document as Aliyev’s constitution. Their resistance comes amid a new wave of criminal prosecutions targeting opposition figures.

But the increasingly politicized use of law enforcement and the judiciary should also prompt the opposition to consider an unconventional strategy: using its six votes to force the government into a constitutional bargain.

The leverage of six votes

Instead of simply opposing a new constitution, opposition parties could make their support for a referendum conditional on substantial democratic reforms.

They could demand a constitutional reform commission with meaningful opposition representation and a mandate to draft a constitution that establishes effective checks and balances.

The immediate dispute concerns the Constitution’s preamble, which refers to Armenia’s 1990 Declaration of Independence. That declaration, in turn, cites a 1989 decision on the reunification of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan argues that these references amount to territorial claims and has demanded their removal as a condition for a lasting peace agreement.

The demand to change the constitutional preamble is another episode in a long series of national humiliations for Armenia.

But realism is essential. Armenia’s independence, or the aspiration to return to Nagorno-Karabakh, depends on far more than constitutional language. As Otto von Bismarck famously argued, the great questions of the age are decided by iron and blood. Not much has changed since his time.

The opposition has the resources and legal expertise to turn its six votes into leverage for a constitution that genuinely limits executive power. A good constitution should be written with a bad government in mind.

With that principle, the opposition could put forward concrete demands.

Shorten parliamentary terms from five to four years.

Armenia’s National Assembly is elected for five years. That is too long for a political system in which parliament has limited means of restraining the executive. Elections are among the strongest instruments for holding governments accountable. Requiring voters to renew or withdraw their confidence in a government every four years would strengthen that accountability.

Introduce a two-term limit for prime ministers.

Armenia’s Constitution places no limit on the number of terms a prime minister may serve. A governing party can therefore keep the same leader in office indefinitely, provided it continues to command a parliamentary majority. Hungary offers a recent precedent. In June 2026, its parliament approved a constitutional amendment limiting prime ministers to a maximum of eight years in office. Armenia should introduce a similar restriction: no more than two terms, or eight years in total.

Give parliament the power to dissolve itself.

Under the current Constitution, Armenia’s National Assembly cannot independently vote to dissolve itself. Early elections are possible through specific constitutional procedures, including when parliament fails to elect a prime minister after the position becomes vacant or when a constitutional deadlock arises over approval of the government’s program.

In practice, the most important route to early elections has depended on the prime minister’s resignation. Armenia has held two snap parliamentary elections since adopting its 2015 Constitution, which transformed the country from a semi-presidential republic into a parliamentary system.

The first took place in December 2018, following the Velvet Revolution that brought Pashinyan to power. The second was held in June 2021, amid a political crisis following Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 war with Azerbaijan.

Both elections followed Pashinyan’s resignation and parliament’s deliberate failure to elect a successor, triggering its dissolution under the Constitution. The solution is straightforward: parliament should be allowed to dissolve itself by a two-thirds vote of all deputies. Under the current distribution of seats, neither the governing majority nor the opposition could reach that threshold alone.

Such a mechanism would give parliament greater independence from the prime minister and provide an additional way out of a political deadlock.

Strengthen parliamentary oversight of the executive.

Appointments to key positions in the executive branch should require parliamentary approval by at least two-thirds of all deputies.

Under the current balance of power, this would prevent the governing majority from making those appointments without opposition support. Requiring broader parliamentary agreement would reduce the concentration of power in the hands of the prime minister and encourage political compromise over important state appointments.

Strengthen the independence of the judiciary and prosecution service.

Under the current Constitution, parliament elects Constitutional Court judges, the five non-judicial members of the Supreme Judicial Council, and the prosecutor general by a three-fifths majority. The threshold amounts to 63 votes in the 105-member parliament. Civil Contract’s 64 seats are therefore sufficient to make these appointments without opposition support. The requirement should be raised to two-thirds, or 70 votes.

That would force the governing majority, under the present parliamentary composition, to seek broader political agreement on appointments to institutions responsible for upholding the law and administering justice.

Such a change would not, by itself, guarantee judicial independence. But it would make it harder for a single political force to dominate these appointments. Without stronger safeguards, the judiciary and prosecution service will remain vulnerable to being used as instruments of political struggle.

Strengthen the presidency as an institutional counterweight.

Armenia’s transition to a parliamentary republic not only stripped the president of most of his powers but effectively reduced the office to a rubber stamp for decisions made by the governing majority. The answer is not to return to a semi-presidential system, which would be a disruptive change to the country’s constitutional architecture.

But the presidency should have sufficient independent authority to serve as a meaningful check on the government. A president should be an institutional counterweight, not merely a ceremonial figure dependent on the political majority.

A constitution for more than one government

The process of constitutional reform is just as important as the document itself.

A constitution is a political and social contract. It should not be drafted solely by those holding power. Any new constitutional process must meaningfully include opposition parties, constitutional experts, legal professionals and civil society groups.

I harbor no illusions that Armenia’s political forces, whether in government or opposition, are genuinely committed to building a democratic political order. But their competing political interests may now create an opportunity to establish stronger checks and balances.

The government wants a new constitution. The opposition has the votes needed to make that possible.

The question is whether those six votes will be used simply to block constitutional change or to demand a constitution that limits the power of every future government.